Hezbollah Operations in the Tri-Border Area of South America by Kleck, Nicholas
Duquesne University
Duquesne Scholarship Collection
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Spring 2011
Hezbollah Operations in the Tri-Border Area of
South America
Nicholas Kleck
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd
This Immediate Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. For more information, please contact
phillipsg@duq.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kleck, N. (2011). Hezbollah Operations in the Tri-Border Area of South America (Master's thesis, Duquesne University). Retrieved
from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/755
  
HEZBOLLAH OPERATIONS IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA OF SOUTH AMERICA 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
Submitted to McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts 
 
 
 
Duquesne University 
 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree of Master of Arts 
 
By 
Nicholas Kleck 
 
May 2011 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Nicholas Kleck 
 
2011 
 
 iii 
HEZBOLLAH OPERATIONS IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA OF SOUTH AMERICA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Nicholas Kleck 
 
Approved March 22, 2011 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
John Sawicki, Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor  
(First Reader) 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
Lewis Irwin, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor  
(Second Reader) 
________________________________ 
Christopher M. Duncan, Ph.D. 
Dean, McAnulty College and Graduate 
School of Liberal Arts 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
Joseph Yenerall, Ph.D. 
Director, Graduate Center for Social and 
Public Policy 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
ABSTRACT 
 
HEZBOLLAH OPERATIONS IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA OF SOUTH AMERICA 
 
 
 
 
By 
Nicholas Kleck 
May 2011 
 
Thesis supervised by Dr. John Sawicki and Dr. Lewis Irwin 
 
This study examines Hezbollah's depth of involvement in the illegal activities of the tri-
border area of South America. This case study used multiple sources ranging from press 
releases, government publications, to Latin American Journals. The methodology used 
was supported by Joe Feagin's imaginary analytical induction, which complemented the 
wide-berth of sources. This study hypothesizes that Hezbollah is utilizing the tri-border 
area of South America to generate multiple sources of revenue. This concept is confirmed 
by this study where Hezbollah's activities were researched in depth. Consideration of this 
research by American policymakers would aid in the development of tailored strategies 
for the triple border region. 
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Map showing the Tri-Border Area in the circle with detailed 
map of cities. 
Source: Rex A. Hudson, Terrorist and Organized Crime 
Groups in the Tri-Border Area of South America 
(Washington D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress, 2003), 4, 
INTRODUCTION 
Hezbollah was responsible for more American deaths than any other terrorist 
organization prior to the attacks on September 11, 2001.
1
 Their global reach and struggle 
for legitimacy makes them a terrorist organization of a different breed. Former CIA 
director George Tenet testified in 2003: 
"Hezbollah, as an organization with 
capability and worldwide presence, is [al 
Qaeda's] equal, if not a far more capable 
organization. I actually think they're a 
notch above in many respects."
2
 
The Tri-Border Area, bounded by 
Puerto Iguazu, Argentina; Ciudad del 
Este, Paraguay; and Foz do Iguacu, Brazil, 
developed into a breeding ground for a wide array of illegal interests. As a result, the 
research community considers it to be lush ground for terrorist organizations to operate 
unrestricted, including Hezbollah.
3
 
 
                                                 
1
 Douglas Philippone, Hezbollah: The Network and its Support Systems, Can they be Stopped? 
(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 3. The following is a record of Hezbollah attacks on 
U.S. targets: April 18, 1983 suicide bombing of U.S. Embassy in Beirut (60 KIA, 17 Americans); October 
23, 1983 truck bombing of Marine Barracks (241 soldiers KIA); January 1984 Kidnapping/torture/and 
execution of Beirut CIA station chief William Buckley; September 20, 1984 bombing of U.S. Embassy 
Annex in Beirut (30 KIA); July 14, 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847; 1992 bombing of Israel Embassy in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina; 1994 bombing of Jewish Community Center, Buenos Aires; 1996 bombing U.S. 
Military base at Khobar Towers (19 soldiers KIA); 1998 Bombings at U.S. Embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania (12 Americans KIA); October 12, 2000 Bombing of USS Cole in Yemen (17 Sailors KIA).  
2
 U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National 
Security of the United States (U.S. Government Printing Office, February 12, 2003), 60. 
3
 Pablo Halaburda, Terrorism Base Potential in the Tri-Border Area of Latin America (Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 2. 
 1 
 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
The relevance of this research rests on the effort of the United States government 
in combating terrorism. Former President George W. Bush stated that the war on 
terrorism "will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped 
and defeated."
4
 Hezbollah is a terrorist organization and claims legitimacy in its 
operations and political might. Different policy and tactics will be necessary to combat 
Hezbollah. Military actions alone may not prove to be the best strategy against 
Hezbollah.  
 Hezbollah's actions, as well as those of other criminal organizations in the tri-
border area are destabilizing a region within Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina. Their 
illegal activities undermine fair trade as well as the authority of the aforementioned 
governments. Furthermore, the counterfeit trade throughout the region has provoked 
companies like Disney to remove their products from the area. On a larger scale, 
counterfeit trade creates problems for legitimate trade. These issues are of concern to the 
United States for a number of reasons. First, the tri-border area is in close proximity to 
the United States. The potential security threat should be of concern to United States 
policy makers. Second, the illegitimate trade practices of the tri-border area most likely 
affect commerce with the United States.  
 As has been noted, Hezbollah has killed more Americans than any other terrorist 
organization prior to 2001.
5
 Hezbollah has demonstrated a willingness to target the 
United States. These issues are of concern to United States policymakers because of the 
                                                 
4
 CNN, "Address to the Nation," CNN, September 20, 2001, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/. Accessed January 18, 2010. 
5
 Philippone, 3. 
 2 
close proximity of the tri-border area to the United States as well as the lack of authority 
in the region. 
 Finally, American policymakers need to address the issues of the tri-border area 
because Hezbollah is an enemy of Israel. Israel is a close ally of the United States and has 
received support from the United States in the past. It is unlikely a serious threat to Israel 
from any region of the world, including the tri-border region of South America can be 
ignored by American policymakers.
6
 
Existing literature has analyzed the illegal activities in the tri-border area. Other 
research analyzed the tri-border environment in an attempt to determine why it is very 
conductive to illegal activities. Several studies have mentioned an Hezbollah presence in 
the tri-border area. This research closely examines the Hezbollah presence in the tri-
border area. Successful analysis by policymakers will result in tailored policy 
suggestions. 
THEORETICAL FORMULATIONS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 Hezbollah's operations in the tri-border area is the topic of interest in this 
research. In order to thoroughly explore the subject matter, this case study will answer 
four research questions. First, why is Hezbollah conducting operations in the tri-border 
area? Answering this question is key to understanding Hezbollah operations in the tri-
border area. Traditionally, Hezbollah operates in the Middle East, with the majority of 
their operations taking place in Lebanon. The addition of South American operations is a 
variation in tactics worthy of research.  
                                                 
6
 Frederic Wehrey, et. al., Dangerous but not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of 
Iranian Power in the Middle East (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Corporation, 2009), 103. 
 3 
 The next research question this study will examine is what operations are 
Hezbollah conducting in the tri-border area? The tri-border area is riddled with drug 
trafficking, money laundering, recruiting, kidnapping, extortion, bribery, electronic 
pirating, murder, bombings, and plotting terrorist operations. Groups such as organized 
crime, drug cartels, and terrorist organizations are involved in these various activities.
7
 
This research will determine which operations Hezbollah is engaged in by sorting 
through the various activities and organizations of the tri-border area. 
 The third research question is will Hezbollah be successful in their operations in 
the tri-border region? This question aims to determine Hezbollah's level of success, if 
any, in order to anticipate the utility of Hezbollah operations. The fourth research 
question is what are the implications of Hezbollah's operations in the tri-border area 
and how does this affect United States policymakers? Once establishing the why and 
what of this line of reasoning, it is imperative to understand the repercussions of 
Hezbollah's activities. The consequences of Hezbollah's operations in the tri-border area 
require American policymakers to adopt a new policy strategy. This study's analysis of 
Hezbollah operations in the tri-border area will result in several useful nuances in 
strategies for policymakers. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Tri-Border Environment 
The most referenced publication on the tri-border area is Rex A. Hudson's report.
8
 
His report was prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. 
                                                 
7
 Rex A. Hudson, Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South 
America (Washington D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2003), 1-3. 
8
 Rex A. Hudson, Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South 
America (Washington D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2003). 
 4 
The report is highly valued in triple border research because it examines the social and 
political environments which permit such activities as money laundering, drug 
trafficking, illegal weapon sales, and police/political corruption. Hudson's essay was 
crucial to this research because it described the atmosphere in which organizations 
operate within the tri-border area. While Hezbollah is not the focus of his research, 
Hudson does discuss in length the link between the Lebanese Diaspora community in the 
triple border and Hezbollah fundraising activities.
9
 He also explores the operational link 
between Hezbollah and various tri-border organizations like the Lebanese Mafia, Chinese 
Tong, Russian Mafia, and FARC.
10
  
 Larry Rohter has written a number of newspaper articles for the New York Times 
on the triple border which are commonly referenced in triple border research. Rohter's 
articles are very valuable to triple border research because they describe the problems 
with corruption, illegal activities, and the ineffective state responses.
11
 Rohter's articles 
provided this research with a detailed description of the atmosphere of illegal practices 
and explains the difficulties the states are having in regulating the area.
12
 
 Jane's Intelligence Review has published numerous essays that are important to 
triple border research because they depict the area as having an environment conducive to 
terrorist group operations. Mario Daniel Montoya's essay describes several illegal 
operations within the triple border. The essay describes the disagreement among tri-
border states that a problem with terrorist and criminal organizations exists and reasons 
                                                 
9
 Hudson, 24-35. 
10
 Ibid, 38-50. 
11
 Larry Rohter, "South America Region Under Watch for Sign of Terrorists," The New York Times, 
December 15, 2001,  A1. 
12
 Larry Rohter, "Terrorists Are Sought in Latin Smugglers' Haven," The New York Times, September 27, 
2001, A3. 
 5 
that this is a factor preventing agencies from combating the issue.
13
 Daniel Sobelman's 
publication highlights the numerous attacks against the Jewish communities of the region 
and discusses claims that Hezbollah is responsible for the attacks.
14
 These papers were 
crucial to this research in understanding the problems of the triple border area. 
  Hugh Smith's essay is widely referenced in tri-border research. This instance, 
however, was unable to use much of its information because Smith's essay moved in a 
different direction by applying the DIME approach to determining policy effectiveness. 
His article furthermore describes how the tribulations of the tri-border area are used by 
terrorist organizations to support worldwide operations, and much of this information is 
available in other sources like the Hudson essay.
15
  
Criminal Activities of the Triple Border Area 
 There are genuinely useful sources that explain the criminal industry within the 
triple border. Peter Hudson's essay was very useful to this research because it describes at 
length illegal trade practices, the drug trade, weapon smuggling, and political 
corruption.
16
 Diana Jean Schemo's article in the New York Times illustrates in great 
detail the pirated electronic trade and its impact on legitimate trade within Paraguay.
17
 
                                                 
13
 Mario Daniel Montoya, "War on Terrorism Reaches Paraguay's Triple Border," Jane's Intelligence 
Review, December 2001, Vol. 13, No. 12. 
14
 Daniel Sobelman, "Israel Takes Special Interest in the Triple Border Area," Jane's Intelligence Review, 
November 21, 2001. 
15
 Hugh Smith, Terrorism in the Iguaza Falls Region: $100 Bills, A DIME at a Time (Ft. Leavenworth, 
KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2005), 2-24. 
16
 Peter Hudson, "There Are No Terrorists Here; In A Lawless No Man's Land Deep In the Heart of South 
America, Muslims Face Down A Suspicious World," Newsweek, November 19, 2001, 19. 
17
 Diana Jean Schemo, "In Paraguay Border Town, Almost Anything Goes," The New York Times, March 
15, 1998, 2. 
 6 
 An important reference drug trafficking within the triple border is Alvaro de 
Souza Pinheiro's essay on narcoterrorism.
18
 While the focus of his essay is drug 
trafficking in Brazil, multiple key elements were used in this research. He described a 
professional relationship between Hezbollah and FARC operating throughout Paraguay 
and Brazil.
19
 
 An important source for  weapons trafficking in South America is Cragin and 
Hoffman's essay published by the RAND Corporation. While the focus of their essay is 
weapon trafficking across South America, numerous aspects were used in this research. 
Cragin and Hoffman discuss the weapon trafficking operation between Hezbollah and the 
FARC through Brazil and the triple border.
20
 They also discuss in less detail the 
Hezbollah-FARC drug trafficking operation. 
Financing Activities of the Triple Border Area 
 A valuable source of information on Hezbollah financing operations in the triple 
border is an essay written for Telemundo and MSNBC by Pablo Gato and Robert 
Windrem.
21
 The authors highlight a significant flow of money from the tri-border area to 
Lebanon and the operations that generate the revenue.
22
 They further discuss the 
atmosphere of corruption in Paraguay that permits the illegal activities.
23
 This essay was 
                                                 
18
 Alvaro de Souza, Narcoterrorism in Latin America: A Brazilian Perspective (Hulbert Field, FL: Joint 
Special Operations University, 2006). 
19
 Souza, 8-39. 
20
 Kim Cragin and Bruce Hoffman, Arms Trafficking and Colombia  (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
National Defense Research Institute, 2003), 22-23, 26. 
21
 Pablo Gato and Robert Windrem, "Hezbollah Builds a Western Base: From Inside South America's Tri-
Border Area, Iran-Linked Militia Targets U.S.," MSNBC, 2007, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17874369/ns/world_news-americas/. Accessed on January 12, 2011. 
22
 Gato and Windrem, 1-3. 
23
 Ibid, 4. 
 7 
significantly useful to this research because they make connections between Hezbollah 
linked violence in South America with Iran.
24
 
 Blanca Madani's essay is a valued source of information and widely cited in 
research on Hezbollah financial networks.
25
 This researcher found her article useful as an 
overview of Hezbollah utilizing the triple border Lebanese Diaspora community for 
financial operations. Another valuable source of information on Hezbollah fundraising 
operations in the tri-border area is Howard Vincent Meehan's essay.
26
 While much of his 
research focuses on operations in Ecuador, many elements of Meehan's research proved 
valuable to this study. Meehan's research explores illegal operations like money 
laundering and the Lebanese Diaspora community connection. Meehan's research proved 
significantly valuable to this study as he explored lesser researched operations like 
kidnapping, extortion, and the connection between Hezbollah and FARC.
27
 
 Louise Shelley's, et. al.
28
 publication is a crucial source of information on 
Hezbollah operations with other transnational criminal organizations. This researcher 
found their connections between Hezbollah and the Russian Mafia, Chinese Tong, 
Islamic Jihad, and Lebanese Mafia to be very useful.
29
 Several articles from ABC Color
30
 
                                                 
24
 Ibid, 5. 
25
 Blanca Madani, "Hezbollah's Global Finance Network: The Triple Frontier," Middle East Intelligence 
Bulletin, January 2002, Vol. 4, No. 1. 
26
 Howard Vincent Meehan, Terrorism, Diasporas, and Permissive Threat Environments. A Study of 
Hizballah's Fundraising Operations in Paraguay and Ecuador (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2004). 
27
 Ibid, 15-46. 
28
 Louise Shelley, John T. Picarelli, Allison Irby, Douglas Hart, Patricia Craig-Hart, Dr. Phil Williams, 
Steven Simon, Nabi Abdullaev, Bartosz Stanislawski, and Laura Covill, Methods and Motives: Exploring 
Links between Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism (Washington D.C.: 
National Institute of Justice, September 2005). 
29
 Shelley et. al., 49-81. 
30
 ABC Color is a major Paraguayan newspaper with offices in the city of Asuncion. 
 8 
support Dr. Shelley's argument by establishing connections between Hezbollah and 
criminal organizations.
31
  
Literature on Hezbollah 
 A genuine source of information on violent Hezbollah operations within the triple 
border area are ABC Color and the New York Times. This research found these sources 
significantly valuable since they have published numerous articles that link Hezbollah to 
violent operations from the tri-border area, including the Argentine Israelite Mutual 
Association (AMIA) attack in 1994.
32
 
 STRATFOR is an important source of information because it provides a unique 
insight into political, economic, and military developments across the world to 
corporations and policymakers. This researcher found their publications on Hezbollah 
and the triple border region beneficial to this study because their research provides new 
insight on the illegal activities in the triple border region and analyzes the potential for 
future Hezbollah operations.
33
 
                                                 
31
 ABC Color, "Hong Kong Mafia Linked to Hizballah in Tri-Border Region," ABC Color, November 22, 
2002, November 22, 2002, http://archivo.abc.com.py/2002-11-22/articulos/21378/mafia-hongkonesa-
estaria-ligada-al-hizbullah-en-la-triple-frontera. Accessed March 15, 2010. and ABC Color, "Paraguay: 
'Strong Ties' Seen Between Hong Kong Mafia, Tri-Border Based Hizballah," ABC Color, November 22, 
2002, http://archivo.abc.com.py/2002-11-22/articulos/21378/mafia-hongkonesa-estaria-ligada-al-hizbullah-
en-la-triple-frontera. Accessed March 15, 2010. 
32
 ABC Color, "Argentine Prosecutors Link Tri-Border Hizballah Leaders to AMIA Attack," ABC Color, 
May 28, 2003, http://archivo.abc.com.py/2003-05-28/articulos/50080/gobierno-argentino-implementa-
fuertes-medidas-contra-evasion. Accessed March 15, 2010. and Larry Rohter, "Iran Blew Up Jewish Center 
in Argentina, Defector Says," The New York Times, July 22, 2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/22/world/iran-blew-up-jewish-center-in-argentina-defector-says.html. 
Accessed March 15, 2010. and The New York Times, "Bomb Caused Plane Crash, Panama Official Says," 
The New York Times, July 21, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/21/world/bomb-caused-plane-
crash-panama-official-says.html. Accessed March 15, 2010. 
33
 STRATFOR, Paraguay: An Alleged Hezbollah Arrest (STRATFOR, June 17, 2010) and STRATFOR, 
Hezbollah: Gaming Out a Threat Matrix (STRATFOR, July 19, 2006) and Scott Stewart, Iranian 
Proxies: An Intricate and Active Web (STRATFOR, February 3, 2010). 
 9 
Several valuable sources of information are Douglas Philippone's essay as well as 
Kellie Rourke's essay.
34
 This researcher found their essay's significantly valuable to this 
study because they discuss Hezbollah as an organization and discuss their operations in 
the triple border region. Their studies are of particular interest to this research because 
they provide insight on Hezbollah's global operations and explore various policy options. 
Another essay that proved important to this study is Andy Crowe's research that explored 
the impact Hezbollah operations have had on Argentina.
35
 While the focus of Crowe's 
study is Argentina, many key points are useful in this research because Crowe describes 
Hezbollah operations within the triple border.  
 There is some literature that is widely referenced in research on the link between 
terrorist and criminal organizations. Tamara Makarenko's article discusses the influence 
of diaspora communities on areas of operations and the changes over time between 
relationships among criminal organizations and terrorist organizations.
36
 This researcher 
found Makarenko's article of little value in this thesis because there is no discussion of 
Hezbollah or the tri-border area. 
It stands to reason that Heather Golding's paper would be topical in this 
research.
37
  Golding's paper, however, was unsuccessful in presenting any new 
information that was not already available in more detail in other studies. 
  
                                                 
34
 Douglas Philippone, Hezbollah: The Network and its Support Systems, Can they be Stopped? 
(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2008) and Kellie Rourke, U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine: 
Is it Adequate to Defeat Hezbollah as a Threat Model of Future Insurgencies? (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: 
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2009). 
35
 Andy Crowe, Stopping the Next Global Terrorist: a Case Study of Hezbollah in Argentina 
(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2004). 
36
 Tamara Makarenko, "The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay Between Transnational 
Organized Crime and Terrorism," Global Crime, February 2004, Vol. 6, No. 1, pgs 129-145. 
37
 Heather Golding, "Terrorism and the Triple Frontier," Woodrow Wilson Center Update on the 
Americas, April 2002, Issue No. 4. 
 10 
TOPICAL BACKGROUND 
 The objective of this research is to determine what factors are allowing Hezbollah 
to operate in the tri-border area well as evaluate Hezbollah's various operations in the 
region. Prior research has analyzed the illegal activities of the tri-border area and 
attempted to determine why it is very conductive to these activities. Evidence has 
indicated that Hezbollah conducts operations in the tri-border area.
38
 
Geography 
The tri-border area is comprised of three cities, one from each of the bordering 
countries. The Argentine city Puerto Iguazu, the Brazilian city Foz do Iguacu, and the 
Paraguayan city Ciudad del Este establish the tri-border area of South America. The tri-
border area has a radius of 20 km and an influence of approximately a 200 km radius.
39
 In 
1970, the respective national 
governments established a 
free-trade zone in Ciudad del 
Este in order to exploit the 
tourism trade and the cheap 
energy source  provided by 
the Itaipu Dam.
40
 During the 
1980's, Ciudad del Este saw 
its best economic growth. In 
                                                 
38
 Hudson, 14-24. 
39
 Pablo Halaburda, Terrorism Base Potential in the Tri-Border Area of Latin America (Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 3. 
40
 Sebastian Junger, "Terrorism's New Geography," Vanity Fair, Issue No. 508, December 2002, pg. 196. 
as cited in Hudson, 6. 
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the 1990's, the city shifted its economy towards illegal activities.
41
  
Ciudad del Este is East of the Pan American Highway. Paraguayan Route 7 runs 
from Asuncion, Paraguay, turns into BR 277
42
 and continues toward Curitiba, Brazil, 
which is located near the port of Paranagua. The Brazilian city Foz do Iguacu is across 
the 303 meter Friendship International Bridge from Ciudad del Este.
43
 The Argentine city 
of Puerto Iguazu is located where the Parana and Iguazu rivers merge. Puerto Iguazu has 
access to the Atlantic Ocean via small freighters. While Puerto Iguazu cannot access 
Ciudad del Este because of the Parana river, it has access to Brazil's Foz do Iguacu via 
the 489 meter Tancredo Neves International Bridge.
44
 The geographic location of these 
cities creates a cheap supply-trade chain from the Pan American Highway to the Atlantic 
Ocean.  
Economy 
Factors such as tepid economic policy, a lack of state effort to control the region, 
and a cheap source of energy create an environment conducive to illegal activities in the 
tri-border area. As we have noted, free-trade laws allow the region to prosper 
economically. The Sacoleiros, which are human porters who smuggle illegal goods, 
import goods in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay without paying taxes. In turn they carry the 
goods across the Friendship Bridge into Brazil.
45
 This process jumpstarted an idle 
economy in the 1980's. This method of transport while illegal, was tolerated by officials 
                                                 
41
 Anthony Faiola, "US Terrorist Search Reaches Paraguay: Black Market Border Hub Called Key Finance 
Center for Middle East Extremists," The Washington Post, October 13, 2001, A21. 
42
 Brazil Highway Route 277. 
43
 Hudson, 7. 
44
 Ibid, 8. 
45
 Mariano Bartolome, "Threats to the Security of States: The Triborder as a 'Grey Area' in the Southern 
Cone of South America," Military Review, Spanish Edition, July-August 2002, 2. 
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due to economic success.
46
 Organized crime and terrorist organizations saw how lenient 
border protection was between Paraguay and Brazil and started using it to traffic 
weapons, drugs, and money.
47
  
Immigration 
 Loose immigration policy allows people from any country belonging to 
MERCOSUR
48
 to transit freely among countries. Criminals are difficult to detect by 
authorities since they move fluidly from one country to another. Brazil has the largest 
population of Arab ancestry outside of the Middle East, approaching 12 million.
49
 
Approximately 9 million of this population is of Lebanese descent.
50
 While the tri-border 
area does not compete with the population numbers of Brazil, its statistics are 
noteworthy. It is estimated that the tri-border area encompasses an Arab community of up 
to 30,000 immigrants.
51
 Approximately 90% of this community is from Palestinian and 
Lebanese ancestry.
52
 Argentina estimates its Muslim population ranges from 700,000 to 
                                                 
46
 Adriano Barbosa, Combating Terrorism in the Brazilian Tri-Border Area: A Necessary Law 
Enforcement Strategic Approach (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 16. 
47
 Barbosa, 13. 
48
 Halaburda, 3. MERCOSUR is the South Common Market. The countries that belong to this market are 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Brasiguayos are Brazilians of Arab descent who settle in 
Paraguay or Paraguayans who settle in Brazil.  
49
 Barbosa, 16. 
50
 Ibid, 16. 
51
 The New York Times reports that “more than 20,000 Middle Eastern immigrants, most from Lebanon 
and Syria, live in the area.” See Larry Rohter, “South America Region Under Watch for Signs of 
Terrorists,” New York Times, December 15, 2002, 1A. Jane’s Intelligence Review notes that the region’s 
629,000 population includes 23,000 Arabs of Palestinian and Lebanese descent. See John Daly, “The 
Suspects: The Latin American Connection,” Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor, October 1, 2001. The 
30,000 figure is cited by Marc Perelman, "U.S. Joining Terrorism Probe Along Lawless Brazil Border: 
Hezbollah, Al Qaeda Links Sought," The Lebanese Foundation for Peace (LFP), December 13, 2002. 
http://www.free-lebanon.com/LFPNews/2002/terrorprobe/terrorprobe.html. accessed January 12, 2010. 
52
 Bartolome, 4. 
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900,000.
53
 Argentina's Jewish population is approximately 250,000; with the majority 
living in Buenos Aires.
54
 
 The Arab communities of Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguacu maintain their own 
schools, clubs, and many live in gated communities.
55
 A closed society such as this is 
very difficult to penetrate externally. This cultural isolation makes this population ideal 
for Arabic-speaking transnational groups. 
State Control 
 It is estimated that in 2001 Ciudad del Este's economy was larger than that of the 
rest of Paraguay.
56
 Heavy person and vehicle traffic crosses the Friendship Bridge 
between Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguacu daily. The travelers often cross without 
documents since spot checks are limited to 10 percent of the traffic.
57
 Brazil and 
Argentina, however, have since implemented stringent border regulations to combat the 
smuggling. Commerce between Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguacu has dropped by an 
estimated 90 percent.
58
 Smuggling has not disappeared though. Skeptics of the 
regulations believe change can only take place when the bribe culture and customs of the 
border agents changes.
59
 
Illegal Organizations and Activities 
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 Organized crime and terrorist groups utilize the environment of the tri-border area 
for a number of financing operations including: narcotics trafficking, money laundering, 
counterfeiting United States dollars, smuggling pirated software and counterfeit products, 
swindling schemes, extortion, bribery, attacks against local officials, attacks against 
Jewish communities, and plots to attack the United States.
60
 
 The Lebanese Mafia plays a large role in the trafficking of Andean cocaine 
through Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguacu to Brazilian seaports.
61
 Numerous studies 
have stated that "the distinction between Hizballah and the Lebanese Mafia is not at all 
clear;"
62
 thus blurring the border between organized crime and terrorist groups. If they 
are not unified, they are most likely working closely. The FARC
63
 is not clearly related to 
the tri-border area. During the 1990's, however, their drug trafficking activities brought 
them into contact with Brazilian and Russian Mafias connected to the tri-border area. One 
of the FARC's largest havens was located 100 miles north of Foz do Iguacu. This haven 
was owned by Ahmad Mohamad, a naturalized Lebanese businessman living in 
Paraguay.
64
  
Money laundering operations in the tri-border area are believed to be financing 
Hezbollah. An Argentine official stated  that "thousands of U.S. dollars bearing stamps 
from Lebanese currency exchange banks, tens of thousands of dollars in phony bills, and 
                                                 
60
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receipts from wire transfers (are) made between the tri-border area and the Middle 
East."
65
 
Chinese Tongs operating in the tri-border area extort the local population by 
offering protection to local businesses and tax containers imported from Asia.
66
 The 
Hong Kong criminal groups are known to traffic pirated software into Ciudad del Este 
from China. It is suspected that this criminal organization sustains a working relationship 
with the tri-border Hezbollah.
67
 These organizations routinely bribe Paraguayan judges in 
order to operate without restriction.
68
 
Violent activities permeate the tri-border area. Violence attacks are known to 
occur against local business and officials.
69
 Furthermore, two terrorist attacks occurred in 
Argentina in the 1990's. On March 17, 1992 the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires was 
bombed, killing 29 and wounding 242 civilians. This attack was followed by the bombing 
of a Jewish Community Center
70
 on July 18, 1994 that killed 85 civilians. Investigations 
into both bombings pointed to Hezbollah agents operating within the tri-border area.
71
 
These attacks are unique in that they are Hezbollah response to Israel targeting 
Hezbollah's leadership in Lebanon. What makes these attacks interesting is that 
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Hezbollah staged attacks in a remote part the world away from their core organization. 
This is an indication of the robustness of Hezbollah's infrastructure.  
In a hearing before Congress, an American Congressman stated that "open-source 
reporting indicates that the FBI claims that Islamic extremist cells linked with Hizballah, 
Islamic Jihad, and al Qaeda are operating in Paraguay, Uruguay, and Ecuador."
72
 The 
Brazilian newsweekly Veja reported that Osama bin Laden visited Foz do Iguacu in 
1995.
73
 
Hezbollah 
Hezbollah
74
 was officially established in 1982 as an armed resistance movement. 
Over the course of a decade it transformed into a political, military, and social 
institution.
75
 In 1992 Hezbollah participated in Lebanon's parliamentary elections and 
won 12 seats.
76
 Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 validated Hezbollah's shift in 
the tactics used to achieve their goals.
77
  
Hezbollah funds its operations through state sponsorship, the diaspora 
communities from West Africa, the United States, and the tri-border area of South 
America, as well as illegal activities. It is estimated that Iran not only provides weapons 
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and training but also up to 100 million dollars annually.
78
 Syria is also a sponsor of 
Hezbollah. Their contribution, however pales in comparison to Iran. Iranian support is 
especially important in funding Hezbollah's political, military, and social operations. 
Since Lebanon is ravaged by war, Hezbollah funds community reconstruction projects as 
part of its social service operations. These programs designed to win the hearts and 
minds of the local population are called the construction Jihad by Hezbollah. They are 
key to their claim for legitimacy and campaign for continuous financial support.
79
 
Hezbollah's use of the tri-border area as a financial resource indicates a drive 
toward self-sufficiency.
80
 The global war on terrorism (GWOT) has pressured States to 
discontinue sponsorship of terrorist organizations. After pressure from the United States, 
Libya recently reversed state policy and ceased WMD
81
 attainment operations. If Iran and 
Syria yield to the GWOT pressures, Hezbollah will be required to satisfy its financial 
needs independent of state sponsorship.
82
 The result would force Hezbollah to increase 
operations in the tri-border area for financial support. To date, both Iran and Syria 
continue to support Hezbollah.
83
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This case study will employ the method of analytical induction as explained by 
Joe Feagin. The concept of analytical induction has changed over time. Initially, it was 
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used to identify universals in social life.
84
 The theory evolved because the term universal 
does not account for irregularities in cases. A looser definition has been adopted: "(i)t is 
often used to refer to any systematic examination of similarities that seeks to develop 
concepts or ideas."
85
 
This hybrid definition has the researcher investigate evidence that challenges or 
refutes the ideas they are developing. By comparing evidence, the researcher is better 
able to define categories or concepts. Sociologists Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss 
termed this the constant comparative method. In this method, the researcher compares 
evidence across cases to develop concepts or ideas.
86
 
Analytical induction and the constant comparative method work best when there 
are many examples of the phenomenon being studied.
87
 Utilizing several cases allows the 
researcher to develop the necessary comparative framework.
88
 This framework ensures 
research reliability or the ability to replicate the study. What method, however, is the 
research to employ when the event being studied occurred once or is a single historical 
period? Joe Feagin and Anthony Orum argue that a single-case study is structured in a 
way that provides a solution to this problem. The answer lies in using a methodology 
similar to analytical induction.
89
 This methodology was demonstrated in Anthony Orum's 
case study of Austin, Texas. 
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In Orum's case study of Austin, Texas he sought to determine who was behind the 
development of the city and how its growth would impact the political composition of the 
city. The study turned into an analysis of urban growth. Instead of using theoretical 
generalizations to label Austin as a certain type of city, he analyzed Austin's history.
90
 
 In order to accomplish this, a new methodology needed to be developed to 
analyze various kinds of data instead of traditional surveys. His data was composed of 
newspaper scraps, diaries, city records, as well as letters and oral histories. The 
methodology would have to be able to identify social contexts within events as well as 
enable the researcher to draw inferences from the evidence and even causality. The 
method was termed imaginary analytical induction.
91
 Because the research lacked the 
cross-case comparison of traditional analytical induction, the researcher made 
comparisons to some extent on an imaginary basis.
92
 In the end, he was able to determine 
that several forces were responsible for the expansion of Austin. 
This research will use a method similar to Feagin's imaginary analytical induction 
and analyze data gathered from historical materials, newspaper articles, government 
documents, books, interviews and military publications related to the tri-border area. The 
strength of analytical induction as it applies to this research is its ability to remain fluid 
with data sets. As analysis develops, the data search may be altered to re-define concepts 
or further analysis. This method is limited to purely qualitative standards. In turn it fails 
to draw statistical values associated with quantitative research.
93
 Adopting this strategy 
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will allow this research to develop concepts linking Hezbollah to numerous activities in 
the tri-border region. 
VARIABLES 
The independent variables in this research are factors that have caused Hezbollah 
to conduct operations in the tri-border area. Analysis of these variables will diagram a 
cause-effect relationship between the atmosphere encompassing the tri-border area and 
Hezbollah operations. The first variable to be analyzed is the geographic layout of the tri-
border area. This includes the close proximity of the cities, highway routes, bridges, and 
waterways.   
The second variable to be analyzed is Arab immigration into the tri-border area. A 
sizeable Arab community is key to establishing a basis of operations for Hezbollah. In his 
research Adriano Barbosa noted that there are 12,000,000 Brazilians with Arab ancestry, 
of which 9,000,000 are traced to Lebanon; the home of Hezbollah.
94
 
The third independent variable subjected to analysis is the economic environment. 
Factors like the free-trade laws established by Brazil and Paraguay established an 
environment conducive to illegal activities. The aforementioned governments established 
a free-trade zone in order to develop the region of Iguassu Falls and promote trade. 
Migration and trade grew in the area. Illegal activities, however, became custom as a 
consequence.
95
 
The fourth independent variable is the lack of state regulation controlling 
problems like  cross-border travel and corruption. Sacoleiros are small businessmen that 
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travel to Paraguay to purchase goods with little or no payment of taxes.
96
 The goods are 
then smuggled across the Friendship International Bridge back into Brazil to be traded for 
profit. Travelers often cross the bridge without documentation since authorities are 
limited to infrequent spot-checks.
97
 Enforcement is difficult when the economy of Ciudad 
del Este is larger than the rest of Paraguay.
98
 
Analysis of the independent variables will search for causal links to the dependent 
variable. The dependent variable is Hezbollah operations in the tri-border area. This 
variable encompasses subsets that will be analyzed including: trafficking weapons, drugs, 
humans, and pirated electronics through the tri-border for financial support as well as 
Hezbollah's financial support from the diaspora community and extortion operations of 
the local population. The planning of operations against American targets and Jewish 
communities in the tri-border area will also be examined. 
The method of analytical induction allows this study to determine why Hezbollah 
is involved in a number activities of the tri-border area. Furthermore, once this research 
has determined what operations Hezbollah is conducting and their level of success, it will 
draw the implications of Hezbollah's presence in the tri-border area. Finally, this method 
allows for an accurate policy prescription by focusing on Hezbollah's activities and not 
every activity of the tri-border area. 
ANALYSIS 
 This essay focuses on the social, political, economic, and geographic factors 
surrounding the tri-border area of South America. Examining each factor led to a better 
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understanding of Hezbollah operations. The subsequent analysis is broken down in the 
following sections. 
Hezbollah Use of the TBA Geographic Features 
We have noted the three cities comprising the tri-border area are Puerto Iguazu, 
Foz do Iguacu, and Ciudad del Este. The areas 
encompassing each city makes up the 20km radius 
known as the tri-border area.
99
 
 The Brazilian city of Foz do Iguacu is located 
in the extreme west part of Parana state.
100
 It serves as 
the center of tourism for the tri-border area. Its location makes it the nexus between 
Puerto Iguazu and Ciudad del Este. The cities are divided by two rivers. The Rio Parana 
flows North to South, separating Foz do Iguacu with Ciudad del Este. The Rio Iguacu 
flows west to east and merges with the Rio Parana at Puerto Iguazu. This divides Foz do 
Iguacu with Puerto Iguazu. The Friendship International Bridge links Foz do Iguacu with 
Ciudad del Este, where the slogan 'anything goes' describes the atmosphere.
101
 It is 
estimated that 30,000-40,000 people and 20,000 vehicles travel the bridge daily.
102
 Many 
of those employed in Ciudad del Este cross the bridge to reside in the safer atmosphere of 
Foz do Iguacu.
103
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 Tourism is the primary source of economy in Foz do Iguacu.
104
 A notable 
contributor to the economy is BR 277, 
a 650 km Brazilian highway that runs 
from Ciudad del Este, through Foz do 
Iguacu,  to the Brazilian seaport 
Paranaguá. The Fraternity Bridge 
connects Foz do Iguacu with the 
Argentine seaport Puerto Iguazu.
105
 
Small freighters can access this port 
from the Atlantic Ocean.  
The Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este is located to the West of Foz do Iguacu. 
This city is the site of illegal manufacturing, trade, and sale of everything from 
electronics to Kalashnikov automatic rifles.
106
 This will be discussed in further detail 
under economic environment. 
Paraguay relies heavily on the BR 277 for importation and exportation. Ciudad 
del Este is connected to the Pan American Highway via Route 7. The Pan American 
Highway is a system of highways connecting North America with South America and is 
important to the economies of all three countries.
107
 Ciudad del Este also relies on the Rio 
Parana for trade since it connects to the Atlantic Ocean at Buenos Aires. 
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The Itaipu Dam has the capacity to generate the most electricity in the world. The 
dam is 15 km north of the Friendship Bridge and crosses the Rio Parana. It is owned by 
both countries. The Itaipu Binacional Company manages dam operations. The plant has 
18 turbines, nine on each country's side.
108
 The greatest significance of the dam is that it 
provides cheap electricity to the tri-border area.
109
 
 Puerto Iguazu has developed its own infrastructure around tourism.
110
 The city's 
port is designed to accommodate small Atlantic freighters. The transports travel the Rio 
Parana to the Atlantic Ocean through Buenos Aires. Puerto Iguazu has the least economic 
activity of the three cities that make up the tri-border area.
111
 
A system of highways, bridges, and waterways creates an environment conducive 
for trade. Foz do Iguacu, Ciudad del Este, and Puerto Iguazu are connected by two large 
bridges. Highway 12 runs through Argentina and Puerto Iguazu to Foz do Iguacu. 
Highway BR 277 runs from the Atlantic seaport Paranaguá to Foz do Iguacu. Paraguay 
Highway 7 connects to the Pan American Highway. This highway system connects the 
cities of the tri-border area with seaports and an intercontinental highway.  
The geographic layout of the tri-border region is conducive to trade and illegal 
activities. The close proximity of the three cities as well as the bridge and highway 
systems allows goods to flow through the area. Another way commerce flows through the 
tri-border area is through Port Iguacu, which brings in freighters from the Atlantic. The 
Itaipu Dam provides a cheap source of energy for the clandestine assembly plants just 
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Assad Barakat awaiting 
extradition to Paraguay 
Source: ABC Color, June 9, 
2003 
above merchant shops.
112
 This study found that Hezbollah capitalizes on the geographic 
layout of the triple border region and uses illegal trade networks to move counterfeit 
goods, drugs, and weapons throughout the region. Specific examples of Hezbollah 
involvement in counterfeit trade practices, drug routes, and weapon trafficking will be 
examined in the subsequent sections. 
Hezbollah Exploitation of Arab Diaspora in the Triple Border 
 The tri-border area is home to approximately 25,000 to 30,000 Arab residents.
113
 
Many of these residents are decedents of families that fled Lebanon after the Arab-Israel 
war in 1948 and the Lebanese civil war in 1985.
114
 The result of this immigration pattern 
is that the majority of Muslims residing in the tri-border area are of Lebanese origin.
115
 
 It is difficult to determine exact figures on how many residents in Foz do Iguacu, 
Ciudad del Este, and Puerto Iguazu are of Arab origin. One estimate reports that Foz do 
Iguacu contains 10,000 to 21,000 Arabs of Lebanese 
descent.
116
 The remaining Arab immigrants most likely 
reside in Ciudad del Este. This is a result of Arab 
immigrants not feeling welcome in Puerto Iguazu, thus 
avoiding the area.
117
 Ciudad del Este contains an estimated 
7,500 retailers of Arab origin.
118
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 In February 2002, Paraguayan police arrested Ali Khalil Mehri, a Lebanese 
businessman in Ciudad del Este. Mehri had sold millions of dollars of pirated electronics 
and funneled the profits to Hezbollah.
119
 Some accounts state Mehri was released on bail, 
others state he bribed guards and subsequently fled to Brazil and finally to Syria.
120
 
 Assad Ahmad Barakat is not only chief of military operations but also chief 
Southern Cone fun-raiser for Hezbollah in the tri-border area.
121
 Barakat arrived in 
Paraguay in 1985 after fleeing the Lebanon Civil war. He established a network of 
businesses in Ciudad del Este that are linked to Hezbollah fundraising.
122
 In 2003, 
Argentine authorities linked Barakat to the 1994 bombing of the AMIA.
123
 Barakat fled 
to Brazil after feeling pressure from Paraguayan authorities.  
Paraguay began to raid his shops and arrested several of his employees for 
sending money to Hezbollah. A letter was seized, written by Hezbollah Secretary-
General Hassan Nasrallah where he states that he "is one of the most thankful for the 
contributions Assad Ahmad Barakat has sent from the Triple Border".
124
 Sobhi Mahmoud 
Fayad was arrested by Paraguayan anti-terrorist police for funneling money to Hezbollah. 
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Fayad was linked to Barakat. On a raid at another of Barakat's stores, Kassen Hassan 
Baalbaki was arrested while destroying computer equipment.
125
  
Argentine intelligence discovered a link between Sheik Mounir Fadel, a spiritual 
leader of Ciudad del Este's main mosque and a number of terrorist groups. The groups 
include Hezbollah and Egypt's al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad.
126
 In 2001, ten 
Lebanese Arabs were caught in Mexico City on a mission to assassinate President 
Vicente Fox. The terrorist reported that they traveled to Mexico through the tri-border 
area after receiving some training.
127
  
Osama bin Laden visited Foz do Iguacu in 1995.
128
 By 1999, several extremist 
groups in the tri-border area were operating under guidance from bin Laden.
129
 At the end 
of 1999, simultaneous terrorist attacks against Jewish targets in Ciudad del Este, Buenos 
Aires, and Ottawa, Canada were prevented. Osama bin Laden has been planning the 
attacks with Hezbollah leader Imad Mouniagh.
130
 In 2002, Barakat was linked to Osama 
bin Laden. Barakat was funneling money from a company he owned in Beirut to al 
Qaeda.
131
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The tri-border region represents a fertile area for recruitment for operations 
because 90% of the Arab population is of Lebanese descent.
 132
 As a consequence, 
Hezbollah has targeted the Arab population in the tri-border area for financial and 
operational support. Mehri, Barakat, and Fayad are examples of Arab individuals living 
in the tri-border area financing Hezbollah. Sheik Fadel is linked to terrorist organizations 
in Egypt.
133
 The ability to move between tri-border states with little interference makes 
the area attractive to terrorist organizations like Hezbollah. 
Hezbollah Manipulation of the Triple Border Economic Environment 
 Economic liberalization in the tri-border region initially thrived due to the cheap 
energy and economic freedoms of the area. When trade and tourism slowed in the 1980's, 
criminal and terrorist organizations sought to capitalize on the financially lush 
environment. The result is a lawless land dominated by illegal activities.
134
 
 While it is difficult to estimate the economy of the tri-border area, Hudson 
approximates the financial system to generate 12 billion USD per year in legal and illegal 
commerce.
135
 The economy of the tri-border area surpasses that of Paraguay's.
136
 In 
addition to legal trade and tourism, billions of dollars 
are laundered through the area annually.
137
 In 
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Paraguay, imports are taxed at 10 percent. This is considerably less than Argentina's tax 
rate of 23 percent. The criminal system, however, in the tri-border area avoids paying any 
taxes.
138
 
 Sacoleiros are unemployed or small businessmen in Ciudad del Este who exploit 
the uneven tax environment of the tri-border area.
139
 They move products like cigarettes, 
electronics, and liquor from Ciudad del Este to Foz do Iguacu. Since the economies of the 
tri-border cities benefited from the illegal transfer of goods, officials maintained lose 
control on the border. Organized crime saw how permissive the borders were throughout 
the region. As a result drugs and weapons were moved through the same channels that 
illegal trade developed.
140
  
 This study has described the economic environment in the tri-border area as 
conducive to not only illegal trade but illegal activities such as drug and weapons 
smuggling. The close proximities of the cities expedites trade. The absence of taxes in 
Ciudad del Este creates a demand for cheap products in Foz do Iguacu. Tens of thousands 
of people cross the bridges daily smuggling the cheap goods. Since this is beneficial for 
the economies, the States refuse to regulate the borders. Terrorist organizations like 
Hezbollah and criminal organizations exploit the porous borders to finance their 
operations. We have noted that Lebanese businessmen like Ali Khalil Mehri, Assad 
Ahmad Barakat, and Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad exploited the economic environment of the 
triple border region to launder a significant amount of money to Hezbollah.  
Hezbollah's Use of Loose State Regulations in the Triple Border 
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 In this section, our analysis examines the dynamic relationship between state 
willingness to acknowledge that a control problem exists and the lack of willingness or 
inability to manage the problems of the tri-border area. There are three very different 
systems in charge of managing the tri-border area. Brazil utilizes police and customs 
officials. Paraguay employs the military to control their portion of the region. Argentina 
has two paramilitary organizations to control its borders and rivers.
141
 
 In late 2001, Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso visited the United 
States and declared that the tri-border area was "safer than London."
142
 At the 3+1 
Group
143
 meeting in 2004, Brazilian Minister Marcos Pinta Gama stated:  
"Brazil has stepped up surveillance in the TBA and has 
found no evidence of terrorism in the region or the rest of 
Brazil. Our intelligence agency says that chance for 
terrorism activity in the TBA is low to non-existent. It's not 
that we do not pay attention we just have found no 
evidence of it."
144
  
 
The public attitude proves otherwise since the tourism economy of the tri-border area is 
declining.
145
 The attacks in Argentina being the exception, Hezbollah keeps the tri-border 
region at low levels of violence in order to not draw attention.  
In terms of corruption of officials, Brazil cannot be overlooked. In 2000, a report 
commissioned by Brazil's congress accused 827 individuals of organized crimes like drug 
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dealing, weapon trafficking, and tax evasion.
146
 The list included two former state 
governors, 15 state deputies, mayors, judges, lawyers, and police officers. The conclusion 
was that corruption was so rampant that it will take years to fix without enlisting the aid 
of the military.
147
  
During the 1980's and 1990, travelers across the Friendship International Bridge 
were subject to 10% spot checks. In 2005 Brazil sought to increase state control in the tri-
border area. They created two offices, the DPF
148
 and the SRF.
149
 As a result, sacoleiros 
travel between Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguacu has declined by 90%.
150
 
Paraguay has attempted to combat the lawlessness of the tri-border area. The 
previously mentioned raids were conducted by Paraguayan military with the aid of 
Argentine intelligence. At the 2004, 3+1 Group meeting, Paraguay outlined a bill in their 
Congress making the process of money laundering illegal. Minister Gama challenged the 
Paraguayan official to supply intelligence showing terrorist activity in the tri-border area. 
The Paraguayan official was unable to supply such intelligence, further reinforcing 
Brazil's argument that terrorism does not exist in the tri-border area.
151
 
Paraguay is not a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) member. A 2010 FATF 
report proposed that while Paraguay has demonstrated progress in improving its 
AML/CFT regime
152
, it continues to remain deficient in criminalizing terrorist financing, 
the freezing of terrorist assets, financial transparency, and implementing effective 
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controls on cross-border cash transactions.
153
 Lombardi and Sanchez in Terrorism 
Financing describe Paraguay's legal and financial systems as underdeveloped. The result 
is that Ciudad del Este attracts criminal and terrorist organizations interested in financing 
their operations.
154
  
Despite Paraguay's efforts, their borders remain porous, extradition problems 
remain, and their criminal justice system suffers from corruption. A report presented by 
the National Direction of Civil Aeronautics concluded that 16 foreigners enter Paraguay 
illegally every week via the Ciudad del Este airport.
155
 Active Paraguayan border control 
remains slack on the Friendship Bridge.
156
 This lack of an effective extradition treaty 
between Brazil and Paraguay has affected Paraguay's ability to establish control in 
Ciudad del Este. After Paraguay arrested Ali Khalil Mehri, he posted bail and fled to 
Brazil.
157
 Feeling pressure from officials, Assad Ahmad Barakat fled to Brazil and 
continued to operate his businesses from there. In 2002 he was arrested on tax evasion 
and was sentenced to six years of jail.
158
 Corruption in Paraguay has reached every level 
of government. Former President Alfredo Stroessner was allegedly involved in drug 
trafficking.
159
 The corruption in the tri-border area allows criminals and terrorist groups 
to conduct illegal activities like bribing judges and purchasing visas. Paraguayan consul 
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in Miami, Carlos Weiss, was arrested for selling more than 300 passports and visas in the 
tri-border area.
160
 
The government of Paraguay attempts to combat the illegal activities of the tri-
border area. Paraguay would suffer the most, however, from increased regulation in the 
tri-border area. The reality is that Paraguay relies on the underground economy of Ciudad 
del Este.
161
 Paraguay is one of the poorest of the South American States. Since the 
economy of the tri-border area is larger than Paraguay's, a crackdown on illegal activities 
would further decimate the economy. The success of controlling the tri-border area relies 
not only on changing atmosphere of corruption and enforcement, but also economic 
policy combating Paraguay's loss of wealth from the tri-border area.  
Hezbollah attacks in 1992 on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and the AMIA 
building in 1994 were clearly planned locally and traced to Hezbollah elements, as 
Argentina intelligence services found.
162
 Argentina recognizes that terrorism in the tri-
border exists. The raids and arrests made by Paraguayan military were supported with 
Argentine intelligence. 
Argentina is not immune to corruption. Allegations of corruption were made after 
the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires. A former Iranian Intelligence Officer testified 
that Iran paid former Argentine President Carlos Saul Menem $10 million to cover up the 
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bombing.
163
 President Menem appointed a former Syrian colonel to oversee customs at 
Buenos Aires's Ezeiza International Airport.
164
 
 Argentina's Puerto Iguazu receives the least amount of economic activity of the 
tri-border cities. In an attempt to regulate illegal activity, Argentina imposed limits of 
$100 per month on nondurable merchandise and $150 on durable merchandise that can be 
purchased in the region and imported into Argentina. The result was that traffic across the 
Fraternity Bridge decreased from 3.4 million individuals to 1.4 million individuals 
annually.
165
  
Argentina has taken the lead on developing initiatives to combat the problems of 
the tri-border area. The Trilateral Joint Command was developed to aid in identifying 
criminal targets. The program designated areas of responsibility for specific agencies. For 
example, the Argentine Coast Guard has been prominent in the surveillance of the Rio 
Iguacu. The result has been a number of raids in Ciudad del Este, shared intelligence and 
tracking systems.
166
 Argentina has reached out to the United Nations, Organizations of 
American States (OAS), MERCOSUR, and the United States in bilateral security 
agreements.
167
 As a result, the Argentine Government and the Central Bank will freeze 
assets of terrorist groups identified by the United States.
168
 
 The United States maintains communication with Brazil, Paraguay, and 
Argentina through the 3+1 Group. The group meets to discuss and analyze preventive 
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measures against terrorism.
169
 Each country, however, maintains a different view of the 
tri-border area. For instance, the Brazilian Minister argued that terrorism does not exist in 
the tri-border area and challenged the Paraguayan Minister to supply intelligence 
countering the argument.
170
 Paraguay recognizes a problem exists, but lacks the ability to 
regulate it. Argentina views terrorism as a problem of the tri-border area.
171
 The United 
States views the problem as a part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and is 
soliciting each state for support on the matter.
172
  
In summation, Brazil does not share the same priorities as Argentina and 
Paraguay, but has demonstrated it has the ability to regulate the problem. Paraguay 
recognizes there is a problem in the tri-border area, but does not have the will or 
resources to regulate Ciudad del Este. Argentina was directly affected by terrorist in the 
tri-border area. They have taken steps to regulate the tri-border area and initiate bilateral 
talks on regulation. Argentina, however, is limited by a poor economy, abusive 
intelligence organization, and lack of cooperation from Brazil and Paraguay.  
The 3+1 Group is a positive measure, but it is not enough to fully combat 
terrorism in the tri-border area. As a result, poor state regulations permit illegal trade 
through tri-border area. This researcher found that inept border control, lack of 
coordination between the enforcement agencies of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, as 
well as corrupt government officials allow Hezbollah and other criminal organizations to 
conduct illegal trade operations in the tri-border area. This study further finds that 
Hezbollah utilizes the porous borders of the tri-border area to smuggle counterfeit goods. 
                                                 
169
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Finally, this researcher found that extradition problems and corruption have allowed 
known Hezbollah agents to operate with impunity and escape justice even when detained. 
Hezbollah Smuggling Operations in the Triple Border 
 Criminal and terrorist organizations conduct a number of smuggling operations in 
the tri-border area, often in conjunction with each other. These organizations are 
capitalizing on the lack of trade regulation, close proximity of cities, cheap source of 
energy, loose border control, and corruption. This section analyzes illegal trade practices, 
pirated electronic trade, weapon trafficking, drug trafficking, and human trafficking for 
Hezbollah involvement. 
 Illegal practices like the sale of counterfeit items allow dealers to sell merchandise 
well below market prices. Paraguay receives an estimated $35 to $40 million in 
merchandise monthly.
173
 Most of the counterfeit products from Asia are bought in the 
free trade zone of Iquique, Chile and then smuggled into Paraguay. Small businessmen 
supply 70% of this commerce to Ciudad del Este.
174
 Counterfeit products from the 
Middle East arrive in the tri-border area from the Ports of Santos (Brazil), Paranagua 
(Brazil), Montevideo (Uruguay), or Buenos Aires (Argentina).
175
 
A few experts estimate 90% of the sales in Ciudad del Este to be counterfeit.
176
 
Items like counterfeit Motorola cell phones are sold for $90. Their market value is $279. 
Video games are sold for $3 and CD's for $2. The latest Nikes and Reeboks are sold for 
$25.
177
 The goods arrive in pieces from other countries and are assembled in clandestine 
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plants, often just above the shop. Fake labels are attached. The items are then sold in 
stores or by street merchants. Items not sold are shipped to other countries for sale.
178
 We 
have noted that Lebanese Diaspora businessmen in the triple border launder a substantial 
amount of funds to Hezbollah.
179
  
Paraguay's tobacco companies manufacture cigarettes intended to be sold in 
illegal markets. Paraguay produces tobacco more than twenty times its consumption. As a 
result, majority of its cigarettes are exported. Majority of the cigarettes are counterfeited 
and smuggled into Brazil and Argentina as Brazilian and American cigarettes. The same 
routes drug smugglers use are often employed for cigarette smuggling.  
This research was unable to determine if Hezbollah in involved in the illegal 
cigarette trade of the triple border. Hezbollah cells in the United States have funneled 
millions from tobacco smuggling to Lebanon. An investigation that began in 1995 led to 
the indictments of 11 individuals for purchasing cigarettes taxed at 50 cents a carton in 
North Carolina and selling them in Michigan, where the state tax is $7.50 a carton.
180
 
Two of the individuals indicted stand trial for funneling profits to Hezbollah.
181
 Cigarette 
smuggling is no new tactic of Hezbollah. It stands to reason that Hezbollah would 
participate in the illegal cigarette trade in the tri-border area.   
 Hezbollah is known to participate in illegal trade practices with other criminal 
organizations in the tri-border area. The Chinese Tongs consist of five clans, each 
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fighting for supremacy of the region. The clans often unite in their movement of 
counterfeit items from Hong Kong to Hezbollah dealers in the tri-border area.
182
 It is 
difficult to distinguish between operations conducted by Hezbollah and the Lebanese 
Mafia. Both are known for smuggling, money laundering, and electronic piracy.
183
 For 
the purposes of this study, Hezbollah and the Lebanese Mafia will be considered separate 
entities, often operating in unison. 
 The Hong Kong Mafia is known to conduct large smuggling operations where 
pirated electronics are shipped from mainland China to Ciudad del Este. Hezbollah 
maintains a strong relationship with the Hong Kong Mafia and most likely shifts pirated 
electronics into the 7,500 retailers of Arab origin in Ciudad del Este.
184
 It is estimated 
that pirated electronics gross $150 million annually in Ciudad del Este.
185
 As a result, 
several organizations including Disney, withdrew its products from Paraguay.
186
 
 Paraguay attempted to destabilize illegal trade and pirated electronic operations 
by conducting raids on several stores owned by Lebanese businessmen. In February 
2000, Ali Khalil Mehri was arrested in Ciudad del Este for numerous software piracy 
charges. The software Mehri distributed to the Arab population of the tri-border area 
displayed interviews with suicide bombers prior to the attacks in Argentina.
187
 He also 
exploited the weak Paraguayan property rights laws by registering the Play Station video 
game brand that is currently owned by Sony.
188
 He is believed to be responsible for 
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sending Hezbollah millions in donations from pirated CD sales. During the raid on his 
Ciudad del Este apartment ledgers were found displaying donations to terrorist 
organizations totaling $700,000 USD. Mehri escaped custody and fled to Brazil and 
finally Syria after bribing an official $3,000 USD.
189
 This researcher found that 
Hezbollah operates with other criminal organizations in the counterfeit merchandise trade 
in order to finance Hezbollah operations in Lebanon. 
The seizure of pirated electronics has provoked violence from criminal and 
terrorist organizations. Uruguayan Customs Director Victor Lissidini was shot by four 
gunmen on motorcycles as retaliation for electronics seized that were in route to Ciudad 
del Este.
190
 In a separate incident, the Foz do Iguacu Council President was shot by men 
on motorcycles. This researcher is unable to determine if Hezbollah is responsible for 
these violent attacks. 
 Weapon and drug trafficking in the tri-border area utilize many of the same routes 
and personnel.
191
 In the following paragraphs, this study examines evidence of the 
activities, draws on their similarities, and examines Hezbollah's involvement. 
Loose border control creates an atmosphere of illegal weapons trade in the tri-
border area. Brazilian weapons are exported into Paraguay. The weapons are 
subsequently re-exported to Brazil with no documentation. This creates large profits for 
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weapon traffickers.
192
 As a result, assault rifles can be purchased in the tri-border area for 
as little as $120.
193
  
A significant number of weapons reach Argentina as well. In 1999, there was a 
singular instance of a judicial cases involving weapons and explosives. In 2000 the 
number of judicial cases involving weapons and explosives increased to 52. This is 
significant because during this time period traffic across the Puerto Iguazu border 
decreased from 3.4 million individuals to 1.3 million individuals.
194
 During the same 
period of time, there was a decrease in border crossing due to increased border security. 
As a consequence, weapon smuggling routes other than the Fraternity Bridge must exist. 
Hezbollah expert Jeffrey Goldberg was conducting research in the tri-border area when 
he was offered to purchase an AK-47.
195
 
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are reportedly involved in 
weapon smuggling within the tri-border area. While no reports include specific activities 
of FARC agents in the tri-border area, FARC is known to smuggle weapons across South 
America.
196
 A report on weapon trafficking in Colombia 
revealed that Colombia's neighboring countries, including 
Brazil, act as sources and transit routes for small arms 
smuggling.
197
 Most of the weapons that reach Colombia from 
Brazil travel through the tri-border area.
198
 In fact, a little less 
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than half of all the illegal weapons in Colombia are flown from planes that departed in 
Brazil.
199
 The weapon trade chain from Brazil to Colombia utilizes corrupt local officials, 
forested terrain, and accessible weapon cashes. The Russian Mafia, Chinese Tongs, Yasir 
Arafat's al Fatah, and Hezbollah are known to utilize this system.
200
 When utilizing 
commercial trade routes in the tri-border area, weapon smugglers often hide their product 
among tourist goods.
201
 This researcher found that Hezbollah is involved in weapon 
trafficking through the triple border to Colombia. 
Drug trafficking is not a new practice for Hezbollah. Hezbollah controls 
Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, which is known for growing opium poppies. A significant 
portion of Syria's economy is derived from drug trade. We already noted that Syria 
provides financial support to Hezbollah.
202
 In January 2002, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) arrested 136 people with ties to Hezbollah. The massive operation 
encompassed 10 United States cities. Drugs, property, and $4.5 million in cash were 
seized.
203
 The operation discovered that millions of dollars were sent to terrorist 
organizations in Yemen and Lebanon. 
204
 In the end, the DEA could not prove that 
Hezbollah was in control of the drug trafficking operation in the United States. 
Loose border regulation and more than 100 clandestine airstrips
205
 allow drug 
smugglers easy transit through the tri-border area. One drug smuggling route brings 
Andean cocaine through Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguacu to the Atlantic ports of 
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Paranaque, Santos, and Rio de Janeiro.
206
 A 2005 UNODC Report stated that Brazil is a 
transit zone for drug trafficking to places like the United States and Europe.
207
 
In January 2003, a Lebanese Mafia ringleader was arrested for trafficking drugs. 
His arrest exposed an operation that smuggled up to 1,000 kilos of Colombian cocaine 
every month through Foz do Iguacu to Sao Paulo.
208
 Lebanese citizen Ali Assi was 
arrested in Beirut's airport with 10 kilos of cocaine. Assi operated a coffee shop in the 
Islamic Welfare Center in Ciudad del Este.
209
 Assad Ahmad Barakat's cousin, Bassam 
Noboulsi, is a Lebanese businessman residing in the tri-border area. On January 29, 2003 
Noboulsi was arrested for having ties to a group of drug traffickers residing in Ciudad del 
Este. Noboulsi owns Hassan Internacional, which is located in Ciudad del Este's Page 
shopping gallery.
210
 Lebanese merchant Hassan Abdallah Dayoub lives in Ciudad del 
Este. He was arrested with 2.3 kilos of cocaine hidden in an electric piano. Dayoub is 
also a cousin of Barakat.
211
 We have noted that Barakat is Hezbollah's financial key 
player in the tri-border area. He has many ties to the drug trade through the triple border. 
This study finds that Hezbollah agents are trafficking drugs through the triple border in 
order to finance Hezbollah operations. 
Research has demonstrated that terrorist groups and criminal organizations have 
created alliances in order to generate economic gain as well as political control over 
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states.
212
 Hezbollah has aligned with other terrorist and criminal organizations to support 
operations in the tri-border area. FARC is known to export Colombian cocaine to the 
United States and Europe. FARC is utilizing the tri-border area as a drug trafficking 
point.
213
 FARC is working with the Lebanese Mafia and Hezbollah to move drugs 
through the tri-border area.
214
 While FARC has many safe houses across South America, 
its largest safe house is located 100 miles north of Foz do Iguacu at the Paraguay-Brazil 
border. The ranch belonged to Lebanese businessman Ahmad Mohamad, who was 
arrested by Brazilian Police in September 2002.
215
  
In 1996, the Russian Mafia made contact with drug traffickers in the tri-border 
area. Their goal was to align their operations with smugglers in order to expand 
distribution of cocaine to Europe. It is 
known that the Russian Mafia worked 
with Osama bin Laden in an attempt to 
establish an al-Qaeda presence in the 
tri-border area.
216
 Bin Laden is known 
to have planned operations in the tri-
border area with Hezbollah operatives. 
It is entirely possible that the Russian 
Mafia is working with Hezbollah in the 
tri-border area to smuggle drugs.  
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Figure 3. Map showing the locations of three of the 
FARC’s Brazilian havens in Miranda, Mato Grosso 
do Sul State; the city of Boa Vista, Roraima State; 
and the city of Guaíra, Paraná State. 
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In recent years, the importance of drug trafficking in the tri-border area may have 
declined as a result of increased surveillance of tri-border security forces. 
Notwithstanding, drug trafficking remains an important activity in the region. This study 
finds that Hezbollah is involved in drug trafficking in the triple border area and even 
conducts trafficking operations with FARC elements.
217
  
There is limited research on human trafficking in the tri-border area. Brazil 
traffics the largest number of victims from the triple border region to North America and 
Europe.
218
 It appears to be a source and transit country in human trafficking. Tens of 
thousands of women and children are trafficked from Latin America and the Caribbean 
for sexual and labor exploitation.
219
 Women and children are trafficked internationally for 
forced prostitution and sex tourism.
220
 The pig iron industry in Brazil uses trafficked 
victims for forced labor.
221
 The Argentine side of the tri-border area has come under 
scrutiny from human rights groups for human trafficking.
222
 A 2008 Argentine law 
criminalizes trafficking in persons for all purposes. Penalties range from 3 to 15 years in 
prison. The length of the prison term is dependent on the nature of the violation and age 
of the victim.
223
 Argentina reports that statewide it has conducted 254 raids, arrested 259 
persons on human trafficking, and rescued 421 victims.
224
 This study, however, is unable 
to determine if a connection exists between Hezbollah and human trafficking operations 
in the tri-border area.  
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Automobile smuggling is a relatively new form of revenue to the tri-border area. 
Luxury model vehicles are stolen from Brazil and Argentina and taken to Ciudad del 
Este. The vehicles are sold in Ciudad del Este well under market price. A Mercedes Benz 
worth $50,000 is sold in Ciudad del Este for $10,000. Paraguayan authorities estimate 
that more half of their 450,000 vehicles registered annually are obtained illegally.
225
 This 
researcher is unable to determine if Hezbollah is involved in automobile smuggling. 
Hezbollah's Use of the Triple Border for Financial Support 
 Hezbollah's total annual operating budget is estimated to be about $100 million.
226
 
In an attempt to gain legitimacy, Hezbollah conducts a number of social support 
operations in Lebanon which they call the Construction Jihad. While Hezbollah 
downplays the significance of its militant branch, the costs of war contribute to the size of 
their budget. In order to finance a budget this large, Hezbollah utilized various sources of 
income. Specific to the tri-border area, Hezbollah receives funds from diaspora 
communities, money laundering, extortion, kidnapping as well as the smuggling 
operations previously discussed. It is estimated that Hezbollah operations in the tri-border 
area generate $10-$12 million annually.
227
 This accounts for approximately 10% of 
Hezbollah's annual budget.  
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 Iran and Syria are known state supporters of Hezbollah.
228
 Initial estimates placed 
Iran's contributions around $100 million in addition to weapons and training. It is 
possible that in recent years, Iran's contributions have approached $200 million.
229
 Syria 
contributes much less than Iran. Majority of Syria's contributions are in the form of 
weapons.
230
 
 Money laundering in the tri-border area is a common practice among the Arab 
population. Estimates average approximately $12 billion is laundered annually.
231
 Prior to 
2000, the most common means to launder money was through the CC-5 accounts. The 
CC-5 is an account that belongs to someone who resides outside the country. The 
accounts are usually opened with false documents, which makes investigations 
difficult.
232
 Since 2000, the most common method of money laundering is through 
mafiosi, or dollar exchangers. Reports estimate this channel launders billions annually.
233
 
Drug trafficking generates approximately 40% of the money laundering in Paraguay.
234
 
Foz do Iguacu is the main money laundering city followed by Ciudad del Este.
235
 
Brazil estimates that $6 billion is laundered annually through Foz do Iguacu. American 
and Paraguay authorities have confirmed that by 2001, an amount between $50-$500 
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million has been sent to Islamic terrorist organizations in the Middle East from the Arab 
residents of Foz do Iguacu through Paraguayan financial systems.
236
 Brazilian money 
launderers utilize a system of depositing money into exchange houses. The money is then 
distributed into CC-5 accounts at exchange houses in Ciudad del Este.
237
 The Lebanese 
Diaspora community launders money through businesses and CC-5 accounts to 
Hezbollah.
238
 The accounts are untraceable since they were established with false 
documents. State regulations fail to prevent money laundering operations. This is because 
corrupt officials sell the false documentation and are involved in money laundering 
schemes themselves. Furthermore, Paraguay lacks the capacity to enforce financial laws 
that make supporting terrorist organizations and money laundering illegal. In 2002, Brazil 
investigated the Banestado Bank in the United States. They found that 12 dealers 
controlled 135 accounts. From these accounts, approximately $18 billion was deposited 
into 35,000 accounts across the world.
239
 
Ciudad del Este has no control, for political and financial structural reasons, on 
the amount of money laundered through the city. Estimates state that approximately $5 
billion is laundered through Ciudad del Este annually.
240
 This is equivalent to half of 
Paraguay's GDP. Money is laundered through illegal foreign exchange shops located near 
the Friendship Bridge. The majority of the shops do not have names. Instead the shops 
have a sign stating that foreign exchange exists.
241
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Hezbollah relies heavily on funding from Shi'ite Lebanese Diaspora communities. 
Diaspora communities of the tri-border area are closely associated with money 
laundering operations.
242
 Hezbollah targets diaspora communities to recruit new members 
from the tri-border Arab population, as well as solicit donations to charities supporting 
Hezbollah.
243
 The social framework of the Arab community allows terrorist organizations 
to operate with little chance of detection.
244
 
This study finds that the diaspora communities of the triple border are sending 
financial support to Hezbollah. These communities are motivated to support Hezbollah 
for communal or ideological reasons. Even the violent attacks in 1992 and 1994 were 
used by Hezbollah to gain support from the Arab community of the tri-border area.
245
 
During the arrest of Sobhi Mahamoud Fayad, police 
found receipts totaling $3.5 million from the Martyrs 
Social Benefit Organization.
246
 The organization 
supports orphans and families of Hezbollah's suicide 
bombers. Authorities estimate Fayad has donated over 
$50 million to Hezbollah since 1995.
247
 It has been 
difficult to track the donations to these front charities 
because there used to be no laws that made financing 
terrorist organizations illegal. Paraguay has since 
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Alleged Hizballah leader Sobhi 
Mahmoud Fayad (right) talks 
with Iman Tareb Khasraji at an 
Al-Mukawama base in Brazil. 
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passed anti-terrorist financing laws. They lack the technical means, however, to track 
donations and enforce the law. 
 Muhammad Yusif Abdallah is the co-owner and manager of the Galleria 
shopping center in Ciudad del Este. Reports indicate that he sends a portion of his profits 
to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
248
 Ali Khalil Mehri used propaganda video tapes produced by 
al-Manar TV to recruit Hezbollah members in the tri-border area as well as solicit 
donations. Mehri also ran a counterfeit CD operation. During his arrest, police found 
4,600 fake CD's and 80 copying machines.
249
 The sales of his counterfeit products 
generated millions for Hezbollah. Assad Ahmad Barakat is in charge of Hezbollah 
financial operations in the tri-border area. His businesses have laundered millions to 
Hezbollah. 
This study finds that Hezbollah uses extortion tactics in the triple border to 
generate revenue for Hezbollah operations. Extortion is the act of obtaining money by 
threat or abuse of authority.
250
 Extortion is common practice among the different 
populations of the tri-border area. Lebanese businessmen are routinely forced to pay 
protection money to Hezbollah agents in the tri-border area.
251
 In addition to laundering 
money to Hezbollah, Sobhi Fayad was arrested for conducting an extensive extortion 
operation. He would acquire 'donations' by force from Lebanese businessmen in Ciudad 
del Este. Businessmen were expected to give as much as 20% of their income to 
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Hezbollah.
252
 In addition to the tri-border area, Hezbollah utilizes extortion tactics in the 
Lebanese communities of Ecuador.
253
 
Extortion operations in the tri-border area have resulted in violence. Reports have 
indicated that an unknown organization is utilizing mafia-style attacks against officials 
that interfere with extortion operations and businesses that refuse to pay 'war tax'.
254
 The 
tax is used to finance terrorist organizations across the world. Lebanese citizen Armando 
Kassen fled to Beirut after being convicted of murdering a Ciudad del Este businessman. 
Kassen was president of the Paraguayan Arab Chamber of Commerce. His victim was 
Ussein Mohamed Taiyen, president of the Ciudad del Este Chamber of Commerce.
255
 
Very little information is available on kidnappings in the tri-border area. 
Kidnapping has been identified, however, as one of the common ways terrorist 
organizations generate revenue in the tri-border area.
256
 Hezbollah has used kidnapping in 
prior operations. Hezbollah kidnapped Beirut station chief William Buckley and executed 
him in January 1984.
257
 One source states that a growing Argentine criminal group called 
The Local Connection utilizes kidnapping techniques. The Local Connection may have 
assisted Hezbollah in the 1993 Israeli Embassy bombing and the 1994 Buenos Aires 
AMIA bombing.
258
 The Local Connection consists of corrupt politicians and former 
military members. Because of its political affiliation, The Local Connection operates with 
impunity.  
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FARC members trained two of Brazil's largest criminal organizations in 
kidnapping techniques. The organizations included the First Capital's Command and the 
Red Command.
259
 Despite the possible Local Connection-Hezbollah link and Hezbollah's 
known association with FARC, this research found no evidence of Hezbollah utilizing 
kidnapping operations in the tri-border area. 
Hezbollah Uses the Triple Border to Plan and Conduct Violent Operations 
 Prior to the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, 
Hezbollah was responsible for more American deaths than any other terrorist 
organization.
260
 Their historical record demonstrates that they will use violent measures 
to further their cause. The evidence of terror activities contradicts Hezbollah's claim as a 
legitimate social and political organization; but stands as an indication of the robustness 
of their infrastructure. Their list of attacks is seen in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
 
 The tri-border area is not immune to the violence of terrorist organizations. 
Numerous attacks were orchestrated out of the tri-border community and have occurred 
                                                 
259
 Pinheiro, 40. 
260
 Philippone, 4. 
DATE TARGET CASUALTIES 
April 18, 1983 U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Suicide Bomber 60 KIA, 17 Americans 
October 23, 1983 Marine Barracks, truck bombing 241 soldiers KIA 
January 1984 Kidnapping/torture/and execution of Beirut CIA 
station chief William Buckley 
 
September 20, 
1984 
U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut, Bombing 30 KIA 
July 14, 1985 TWA flight 847, Hijacking 1 Navy diver KIA 
1996 U.S. Military base at Khobar Towers, Bombing 19 soldiers KIA 
1998 U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Bombings 12 Americans KIA 
October 12, 2000 Bombing of USS Cole in Yemen 17 Sailors KIA 
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in close proximity. This section does not include violence associated with finance 
operations like extortion. 
 At 1442 on March 17, 1992, a pickup truck filled with explosives crashed into the 
front of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina; and subsequently detonated. A 
nearby church, Catholic school, and embassy were destroyed. The explosion killed 29 
people and injured 242. Most of the victims were Argentine children. A terrorist 
organization called Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack. Islamic Jihad has 
known ties to Hezbollah.
261
 American intelligence, however, claims Hezbollah was 
directly responsible for the attack.
262
 
 At 0953 on July 18, 1994 a van parked in 
front of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association 
(AMIA) building detonated. The explosion killed 85 
people and injured more than 300. No organizations 
claimed responsibility for this attack. Evidence 
points to Hezbollah's orchestration with support 
from Iran and Argentine government officials.
263
 In 
2004, Argentine officials linked Ahmad Barakat and 
Imad Fayed Mugniyah to the AMIA bombing.
264
 At 
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the time of the bombing, both individuals were living in Ciudad del Este. Reports indicate 
that Barakat paid for the explosives and imported the necessary materials.
265
 We have 
noted that Barakat is a Hezbollah agent in the tri-border area. A former Iranian 
intelligence officer testified that former Argentine President Carlos Saul Menem was paid 
$10 million by Iran to cover up the bombing.
266
 Hezbollah denies responsibility for the 
1992 and 1994 bombings. Hezbollah knows that accepting responsibility for the 
bombings bring further unwanted attention to the triple border region, which would 
interrupt their financing operations. 
 On July 19, 1994 a suicide bomber caused a Panamanian commuter plane to 
crash. 21 people were killed. The attack killed 12 Jewish people, who were believed to be 
the targets. The investigation did not determine who was conducted the attack and no 
organizations claimed responsibility.
267
 
 In 1999, the Secretariat for State Intelligence (SIDE) began investigating Islamic 
extremist groups in the tri-border area. They determined that bin Laden was gaining 
support because Iran withdrew some of its support for the tri-border area's Arab 
community. Argentine intelligence combined with United States intelligence conducted 
Operation Centaur. The operation prevented multiple large scale terrorist attacks. Osama 
bin Laden worked with Hezbollah leader Imad Mouniagh to orchestrate simultaneous 
attacks on Jewish targets in Ciudad del Este, Buenos Aires, and Ottawa.
268
 Terrorist 
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operators were from Hamas and Hezbollah. Assad Ahmad Barakat, the top Hezbollah 
agent in the tri-border area was involved.
269
 
 Salah Abdul Karim Yassine, a Hamas explosive expert was arrested for using 
false documents. He was living in Ciudad del Este. Authorities uncovered a plot to attack 
the American and Israeli Embassies in Asuncion. The plot involved 30 other Islamic 
terrorist and utilized diversionary attacks elsewhere in the city in order to distract 
security.
270
 
 On October 10, 2001 ten terrorists belonging to a Lebanese Hezbollah cell were 
caught in Mexico City on a mission to assassinate President Vicente Fox. The terrorists 
reported that they traveled to Mexico through the tri-border area after receiving some 
training.
271
   
 Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Mordechai Gur stated in 1994 that "Hezbollah 
was using [Argentina] as a base for terrorist activities."
272
 Hezbollah and al-Qaeda expert 
Tom Knowlton explains that areas with unstable governments with weak economic 
policies are important in Hezbollah operations because it allows them to establish and 
conduct training and operations.
273
 Argentina fulfills the requirements for Hezbollah 
operations. 
Hezbollah training camps are dispersed throughout the tri-border area. This 
research was unable to determine specific locations, but has found evidence that the 
camps exist. Brazilian authorities found photographs of Arab extremist at the Al-
Mukawama training camp. Al-Mukawama is believed to be a pro-Iran wing of Hezbollah 
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living in the tri-border area. Authorities speculate the training camp is located at a farm 
outside Foz do Iguacu.
274
 Argentine authorities found that Hezbollah is operating other 
weekend training camps in the jungle terrain outside Foz do Iguacu.
275
  
The tri-border area has hosted secret terrorist summit meetings. Taliban terrorists 
linked to al-Qaeda are believed to have attended the meeting in 2002.
276
 Argentine 
intelligence learned details of the meeting. In October 2002, they warned the United 
States that the summit planned attacks against American and Israeli targets in the western 
hemisphere. Hezbollah and al-Qaeda members were present at the summit.
277
 Later, 
Argentine intelligence reportedly contradicted the CNN report that the meeting was held 
within the tri-border area.  
 This research found that Hezbollah is using the triple border region as a base for 
planning and conducting violent operations. Hezbollah's attempts to conduct violent 
attacks in the tri-border area have subsided in recent years.
278
 This could be a 
consequence from the arrest of numerous Hezbollah agents in the triple border area. It 
could be, however, a shift in their focus to minimize state interest in the region. This 
would allow Hezbollah to continue using the triple border to generate revenue in the 
millions operations in Lebanon. 
FINDINGS 
The purpose of this analysis is to answer several research questions. The research 
questions in this study are why is Hezbollah conducting operations in the tri-border area, 
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what operations are Hezbollah conducting in the tri-border area, will Hezbollah be 
successful in their operations in the tri-border area, and what are the implications of 
Hezbollah's operations in the tri-border area and how does this affect American 
policymakers? In order to answer the research questions, this study closely examined the 
various activities of the triple border for Hezbollah involvement. This section is devoted 
to the results of that analysis. Table 2 displays the results of the analysis. The 
independent variables in the left column of table 2 are the different features of the triple 
border area which Hezbollah utilizes to their advantage. The dependent variables in the 
row across the top of table 2 are the various activities prevalent in the tri-border area.  
 
Table 2 
 
This study has identified several reasons for why is Hezbollah conducting 
operations in the tri-border area. First, Hezbollah needs multiple sources of funding in 
order to support their social operations known as the Construction Jihad, their quest for 
political legitimacy, and to finance their military operations against Israel. Hezbollah 
receives support in the way of money, weapons, and training from Iran and Syria. We 
have noted that Iran's contributions are much larger than Syria's and gross as much as 
$100 million USD each year. The global war on terrorism (GWOT) has pressured States 
 57 
to discontinue sponsorship of terrorist organizations. Libya recently reversed state policy 
and ceased WMD
279
 attainment operations as a result of GWOT pressures. If Iran and 
Syria yield to the GWOT pressures, Hezbollah will be required to satisfy its financial 
needs independent of state sponsorship.
280
 
The conflicts with Israel have forced a large migration of Lebanese immigrants to 
the triple border region. We have noted that diaspora communities often feel a connection 
to their nation and as a result are willing to offer support. Hezbollah operatives were most 
likely aware of the migration and decided to capitalize on the financial opportunity in a 
part of the world far from their normal operating region. Hezbollah's operations in the 
triple border region attest to the organization's robustness and ability to operate globally. 
The second reason, why is Hezbollah conducting operations in the tri-border 
area, is simply because the tri-border area is conducive to illegal financial operations that 
generate a lot of revenue. Geographic features such as close proximity of the cities, 
highway systems, interconnecting bridges, and Atlantic waterways are conducive to legal 
and illegal trade. The lack of state regulations or ability to regulate the triple border has 
attracted Hezbollah and many other criminal organizations. We have observed that many 
criminal organizations like the Chinese Tong, FARC, Russian Mafia, and Lebanese 
Mafia have sought out the region because of its rich financial opportunities. It stands to 
reason that would Hezbollah begin using the tri-border area as a financial source as well.  
This study combed over the various activities of the triple border to determine 
what operations Hezbollah is conducting in the tri-border area. Hezbollah agents are 
utilizing smuggling networks to move counterfeit items in order to generate revenue for 
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Hezbollah. Numerous Lebanese businessmen like Ali Khalil Mehri, Sobhi Mahmoud 
Fayad, and Assad Ahmad Barakat were arrested in the triple border for operating 
businesses that sold millions in counterfeit goods and pirated electronics. The money 
from the illegal sales were laundered through untraceable CC-5 accounts to Hezbollah 
related charities.
281
 The fact that Paraguay conducted raids on these businesses attests to 
the line of reasoning that Lebanese agents are financing Hezbollah. We know 
furthermore, that Hezbollah often works with criminal organizations like the Chinese 
Tong to move and sell counterfeit goods and pirated electronics.
282
  
We see strong evidence that Hezbollah agents launder millions through CC-5 
accounts and dollar exchanges to Hezbollah. Experts estimate laundered revenue 
approaches $10 billion USD.
283
  We found that known Hezbollah agent Fayad donated 
$3.5 million USD to Martyrs Social Benefit Organization, a charity closely tied to 
Hezbollah.
284
 
The Lebanese Diaspora of the triple border are a close-knit community, making 
penetration difficult. We have noted, however, that the Lebanese Diaspora and businesses 
operating within the community will solicit donations to Hezbollah linked charities.
285
 
Lebanese businessmen in the triple border like Muhammad Yusif Abdallah have been 
arrested for sending portions of their business's profits to Hezbollah.
286
 Barakat's 
businesses have laundered millions to Hezbollah. Barakat was so successful in funneling 
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money to Hezbollah that he rose to head of Hezbollah financial operations in the 
Southern Cone.
287
 
 We have established that Hezbollah agents conduct extortion operations within 
the triple border. Sobhi Fayad was arrested for extorting Lebanese businessmen.
288
 We 
discovered that Lebanese businessmen are regularly forced to pay a donations called a 
war tax to Hezbollah agents, who in turn launder the money to Hezbollah.
289
 This 
researcher was unable to determine if Hezbollah agents are involved in kidnapping 
operations within the triple border. 
We know that the triple border region stands as a transit point for weapon 
trafficking into Colombia.
290
 This researcher found that numerous criminal organizations 
and Hezbollah utilize a system of corrupt officials, forested terrain, and weapon cashes to 
traffic weapons from the triple border to Colombia.
291
  
We have determined that several Lebanese Mafia and Hezbollah agents have been 
arrested for drug trafficking. Lebanese businessman Ali Assi owns a coffee shop in 
Ciudad del Este and was arrested for transporting cocaine.
292
 Bassam Noboulsi and 
Hassan Abdallah Dayoub are Lebanese businessmen residing in Ciudad del Este. They 
are also cousins of Barakat. In separate incidences, they were arrested for possessing 
large quantities of drugs and associating with known drug traffickers.
293
 This study found 
a FARC-Hezbollah drug connection. It was determined that FARC was working with the 
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Lebanese Mafia and Hezbollah to move drugs through the tri-border area.
294
 Finally, this 
study speculates that the Russian Mafia is working with Hezbollah to establish drug 
trafficking routes.
295
 
This researcher has found that Hezbollah has used the triple border to plan 
terrorist attacks. Although Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the 1992 Israeli 
Embassy bombing in Buenos Aires, American Intelligence claims Hezbollah was directly 
responsible for the attack.
296
 It is worth noting that Islamic Jihad has known ties to 
Hezbollah.
297
 We know that Argentine officials linked Hezbollah agents Barakat and 
Mugniyah to the 1994 AMIA bombing.
298
 
We found that Hezbollah has been involved in multiple plots against Jewish and 
Mexican targets. This researcher found that Osama bin Laden and Hezbollah leader Imad 
Mouniagh enlisted the assistance of Barakat in a plan to attack several Jewish targets 
through North and South America.  
This researcher found that Hezbollah utilizes the tri-border area to train agents in 
conducting attacks. This is supported by the evidence that a Lebanese Hezbollah cell 
trained in the triple border and planned to assassinate Mexican President Vicente Fox.
299
 
Argentine officials believe several Hezbollah run training camps, including the al-
Mukawama training camp, are located outside Foz do Iguacu.
300
 This researcher was 
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unable to determine if Hezbollah partook in the terrorist summit meetings held outside 
the triple border region in 2002.
301
  
This study scrutinized many sources to determine whether Hezbollah will be 
successful in their operations in the tri-border area and found that Hezbollah has been 
successful in their triple border operations. This line of reasoning rests on whether 
Hezbollah has been successful in their previous operations, and if they will have 
continued success. First, Hezbollah has demonstrated a significant ability to utilize the 
triple border to generate revenue through the sale of counterfeit goods, pirated 
electronics, weapon and drug trafficking, extortion, and money laundering. Second, 
Hezbollah has successfully carried out numerous violent attacks within the region. The 
attacks attracted the attention of the United States and Argentine intelligence. Subsequent 
attacks have been prevented as a result of the increased surveillance. The number of 
violent attacks has subsided in the region, which could be indicative that Hezbollah is 
choosing to focus on its financial operations. In all probability Hezbollah understands 
that heightened surveillance will put strain on fundraising operations. Thus violent 
operations are at a minimal. Even though Brazil increased border security, smuggling 
operations persist and money laundering continues to finance Hezbollah. This is a result 
of ineffective laws and lack incapable agencies from all of the tri-border states. 
This study's analysis provides some very useful insight into what are the 
implications of Hezbollah's operations in the tri-border area. The foremost repercussion 
of Hezbollah activity in the triple border is the amount of revenue operations generate. 
We have noted that Hezbollah receives up to $10 million USD annually from the tri-
border area. This significant amount of money supports the Construction Jihad in 
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Lebanon. The social movement serves to recruit support throughout Lebanon as well as 
globally. As a result, Lebanese Diaspora communities like the one in triple border 
actively support Hezbollah operations. The revenue also supports the Hezbollah political 
movement in Lebanon. We have observed Hezbollah's political success in 1992 when the 
organization won 12 seats in Lebanon's parliamentary elections.
302
 Throughout its 
existence, Hezbollah has waged war against Israel and the United States throughout the 
Middle East and the world. Revenue generated from the triple border most likely finances 
some of Hezbollah's global military capabilities. Continued use of the triple border will 
serve to finance Hezbollah's Construction Jihad, political movement, and military 
operations. 
The second ramification of Hezbollah operations in the triple border is the 
operational foothold they gain in the western hemisphere. The presence of Hezbollah 
agents operating in the West is a serious threat to the United States. We found that 
Hezbollah has used the triple border to orchestrate violent attacks in South America. 
Hezbollah was successful conducting attacks against Jewish targets in 1992 and 1994. 
Multiple plots to attack Jewish targets in South America and Canada have been 
prevented.
303
 These plots and attacks are indicative of Hezbollah's ability to strike 
globally. The triple border is significant because it is a base of operations for Hezbollah 
far from their Lebanon home. This provides Hezbollah with an effortless capability to 
strike anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, including the United States. We know that 
Hezbollah has displayed the capability and willingness to attack American targets. This 
signifies that the tri-border area is crucial to American security.  
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This study has drawn multiple inferences from the analysis to determine how 
Hezbollah operations in the triple border affect American policymakers. In order to asses 
this effect on policymakers; we must consider what would make the tri-border area less 
conducive toward Hezbollah operations. Analysis determined that Hezbollah capitalizes 
on the geographic layout of the tri-border area. The close proximity of the cities, highway 
systems, waterways, and bridges cannot be altered. Heightened enforcement, however, 
along each of these factors will combat Hezbollah operations. Analysis further 
determined that Hezbollah is utilizing the Lebanese Diaspora and economic environment 
of the tri-border area to generate revenue for their organization. Initiatives to combat 
illegal trade practices as well as eliminating the free trade agreement would dwindle 
criminal interest in the area. The consequence of these policies would negatively affect 
Paraguay's economy, which is largely dependent on the tri-border area. Paraguay would 
be completely ineffective against illegal operations if its' already fragile economy were 
further depleted. 
Military and political leaders often debate the best course of action in dealing with 
terrorist organizations. A popular course of action would be hard military action from the 
triple Border States. Article 51 of the United Nations states that "nothing in the present 
charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed 
attack occurs against a member of the United Nations".
304
 This study has demonstrated 
that Hezbollah has undertaken military operations from the triple border. As a result, they 
are a legitimate target and may be lawfully killed. The consequences of these actions, 
however, must be examined. Hard Military action may deplete the leadership ranks of 
Hezbollah in the tri-border area, and as a result deter some from participating in illegal 
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activities.
305
 On the other hand, it does not address the root causes of all of the illegal 
activity in the tri-border area. Military action may be successful in establishing effective 
border control and combating illegal trade operations, but it fails to address the illegal 
activities like money laundering to finance terrorist organizations.  
Furthermore, several studies have attempted to quantify the martyr effect, a 
consequence of direct military action and targeted killing. The studies indicate that 
recruitment of additional supporters increased all the while operational quality 
decreased.
306
 Direct military action in the tri-border area would most likely result in more 
Hezbollah agents in the tri-border area. 
Indirect policy action is necessary to combat the root causes of the criminal 
activities in the triple border. These potential policy options include legislation outlawing 
financing terrorist organizations and their known charities. Paraguay recently proposed 
legislation to outlaw money laundering.
307
 The legislation is a step in allowing Paraguay 
to become a FATF member. Paraguay, however, lacks the capability to enforce the anti-
terrorism laws strictly. Paraguay needs to develop further anti-terror legislation and 
develop a means to enforce the policies. 
Further indirect policy action includes effort with organizations external to the 
triple border states. Argentina recently developed initiatives with the United Nations, 
OAS, MERCOSUR, and United States through bilateral security agreements to freeze 
assets of known terrorist groups.
308
 Argentina's movement is beneficial to combating the 
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problems of the triple border, but progress is hindered by the reluctance of the other states 
to address the problems.  
Brazil continues to assert that no terrorist organizations are present in the tri-
border area.
309
 This perspective is most notable in the 3+1 Group meetings where 
Brazilian ministers argue against the Argentina and Paraguay perspective that a problem 
exists in the region. Brazil is the most capable of the triple border state in combating the 
criminal activities. Their reluctance, however, prevents the other states from making 
significant progress. 
The 3+1 Group meetings are an excellent forum for open discussions on the 
criminal activities of the tri-border area. The 3+1 Group, however, needs to improve in 
their development of anti-criminal legislation. Aligning the priorities of the triple border 
states will result in linear anti-terror policy. The 3+1 Group should establish regulations 
that allow each of the triple border state's investigative and criminal agencies to 
collaborate on anti-terror and criminal operations. Paraguay and Argentina have already 
worked together in numerous raids on the business of Hezbollah agents. Cooperation 
from Brazil will open further collaboration between the enforcement agencies of the 
triple border region.  
DISCUSSION 
 This study found that Hezbollah uses the triple border for its financial potential as 
well as a base of operations for violent attacks in the Western Hemisphere. The Lebanese 
Diaspora community has established a potential recruiting base and supports money 
laundering operations. Hezbollah works with other terrorist organizations such as al-
Qaeda and Islamic Jihad. They work with criminal organizations like the Chinese Tong, 
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Russian Mafia, Lebanese Mafia, and FARC to move drugs, weapons, and counterfeit 
goods through the region. They have used the tri-border area to carry out violent attacks. 
United States intelligence believes they are responsible for the 1992 and 1994 bombings 
in Argentina. The use of violent tactics has decreased over time. This may be  an attempt 
to decrease attention to the tri-border area. 
 The United States needs to be more involved in the policy process in the tri-
border area of South America. The 3+1 Group is the perfect forum to aid the triple border 
states in developing anti-terror legislation and regulation. Without the involvement of the 
United States, the tri-border states will continue to disagree over the level of threat 
present and continue to operate independently of each other. American policymakers 
have a unique opportunity to unify the tri-border states through a comprehensive policy 
approach.  
 There are a number of limitations this researcher encountered throughout the 
development of this study. First is access to restricted information. Most of the sources 
are news reports, which provide a limited view of tri-border activities. We understand the 
need to restrict this research to only open source documents. Another issue this researcher 
encountered was that many reports were in Portuguese and Spanish. This researcher is 
fluent in neither language, but was able to find translated documents. Finally, much of the 
sources were created prior to 2008. Access to more current reports was largely restricted 
due to their sensitive nature. It is most likely that some circumstances have changed in 
recent years.  
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CONCLUSION 
 Never has a terrorist organization been permitted to operate for several decades in 
so close proximity to the United States. The triple border is significant because it is an 
organizational base for Hezbollah far from their normal area of operation in Lebanon. 
The triple border provides Hezbollah with an effortless capability to strike anywhere in 
the Western Hemisphere, including the United States. We know that Hezbollah has the 
capability and willingness to attack American targets. For this reason, the tri-border area 
is extremely important to American security. It is crucial the United States policymakers 
develop a comprehensive response that not only addresses the illegal organizations of the 
tri-border area but undercuts the social and environmental factors supporting the illegal 
activities. In the end American policymakers and the tri-border states can regain control 
of the lawless region. 
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